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ABSTRACT
Building on recent developments in behavioral asset pricing, we develop a model in which
dispersion of investor beliefs under short-selling constraints drives a firm's stock price above its
fundamental value. Managers optimally respond to the stock market bubble by issuing new equity.
The bubble reduces the user-cost of capital and increase real investment. Using the variance of
analysts' earnings forecasts as a proxy for the dispersion of investor beliefs, we find strong empirical
support for the model's key prediction that increases in dispersion cause increases in new equity















Research on asset prices increasingly challenges the view that asset prices equal fun-
damental value. In particular, ￿nance theory is increasingly sympathetic to the idea
that stock price bubbles are possible. In this paper, we consider their consequences
for corporate investment and ￿nancing behavior. Some theories of bubbles rely on a
common bias in investors￿beliefs. But there also exists an important class of theories
in which bubbles can arise even when beliefs are, on average, unbiased. If pessimists
are constrained in their ability to short, then prices disproportionately re￿ ect beliefs
of optimists, and thus rise above their fundamental value.2 That stock price bub-
bles could arise under these conditions has been pointed by Miller (1977) and Chen,
Hong and Stein (2002), among others. Re￿nements and extensions have also been
examined, including the e⁄ect of dynamic speculative trading (Harrison and Kreps,
1978) and the endogenous formation of heterogeneous beliefs (Scheinkman and Xiong,
2003).3 This is the type of stock price bubble on which we focus in this paper.
What should corporate managers do when they believe that their ￿rms￿stock
prices are in￿ ated for the above reasons? In particular, what should they do when,
as in the above setting, investor beliefs are disperse, and the pessimists cannot short
the stock?4 We make two key observations. First, unlike other agents, ￿rms are
unconstrained in their ability to sell short ￿they can simply issue new shares. Second,
in contrast to textbook models of corporate ￿nance, the above environment implies
that ￿rms face a downward-sloping demand curve for new share issues. Consequently,
since the ￿rm is a monopolist in the supply of its own shares, and since resale in the
2Of course, this class of models does not preclude the possibility that average beliefs are also
biased. Such a bias provides a second source of bubbles that we do not examine.
3See also Allen, Morris, and Shin (2003). For surveys of behavioral asset pricing models more
generally, see Barberis and Thaler (2002), Hirshleifer (2001) and Shleifer (2000).
4Stein (1996) explores rational capital budgeting in the presence of irrational market prices.
Focusing on the ￿rm￿ s invetment decision, he assumes that the market has a biased view of the
￿rm￿ s future. In this class of problems, our paper considers the special case when market pricing
irrationalities are generated by heterogeneous beliefs and short-sale constraints (as in Miller, 1977).
1secondary market prevents price discrimination, the optimal quantity of shares issued
is that which equates marginal revenue with marginal cost. This occurs where price
is above fundamental value. Thus, somewhat counter-intuitively, the bubble survives
the ￿rm￿ s attempt to exploit it.
Our model also considers the consequences for real investment. In general, the
management￿ s decision as well as the market￿ s valuation should re￿ ect the expected
use of funds. If 100 percent of the proceeds were invested in cash, for example,
investors would presumably agree on the value of that portion of the ￿rm￿ s balance
sheet. In our model, the heterogeneous beliefs among investors apply only to the
￿rm￿ s operating assets. This assumption eliminates the manager￿ s incentive to use
the proceeds from the issuance of over-valued stock to invest in cash, marketable
securities, dividend payment, or retirement of the ￿rm￿ s own debt. There is, however,
a real distortion; managers over-invest in operating assets because the market over-
values them.
The model￿ s quantitative predictions are perhaps surprising. Most notably, it
is possible to generate large stock price bubbles with relatively small distortions to
￿nancing activity and real investment. Roughly speaking, this happens when the
demand curve for new shares is steep. Analogous to the monopolist￿ s problem, a
steep demand curve implies a high price over marginal cost and therefore a large
bubble. The large bubble is accompanied by a small quantity of new shares issued
and therefore a small reduction in the cost of capital. This arguably provides a
good description of many stocks that were often described as bubbles during the tech
boom of the late 1990s. Despite sky-high valuations, ￿rms like Amazon and Yahoo,
for example, issued a surprisingly small fraction of total equity to the public. As
we will argue, such behavior is consistent with our model. For policy makers, our
￿ndings suggest that while deviations of stock prices from fundamentals can have
real consequences, large stock price bubbles may be less distortionary than one might
otherwise think.
2Our empirical strategy builds on Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) who use
the dispersion of a ￿rm￿ s stock analysts￿forecasts of its future earnings as a proxy for
the dispersion of investors￿beliefs about the fundamental value of the ￿rm.5 Diether
et al. report that high-dispersion stocks have abnormally low future returns, consis-
tent with the view that such ￿rms are overvalued and that their equity prices move
slowly toward their fundamental value. This variable is particularly well-suited for
our purposes because clean proxies for bubbles are hard to ￿nd. For example, using
the recent equity price run-up to identify a bubble is problematic because the bubble
cannot be distinguished from increased optimism regarding the ￿rm￿ s investment op-
portunities. Such optimism may well be rational and should lead to equity ￿ otation
and increased real investment by the ￿rm.
We ￿rst consider the time series evidence regarding dispersion of analysts forecasts
for the corporate sector and show that they comove with Tobin￿ s Q, net new share
issuance, and real investment. We show that Nasdaq ￿rms, in particular, experienced
a run-up in dispersion during the late 1990s through 2001 that was accompanied by
higher values of Tobin￿ s Q, an increase in new share issues, and higher levels of real
investment. This pattern is consistent with the predictions of our model.
We further investigate the predictions of our model by estimating the e⁄ect of
changes in dispersion on investment, Tobin￿ s Q and net equity issuance within a
panel-data VAR framework. To control for the possible correlation between changes in
dispersion and investment opportunities, we consider the e⁄ect of shocks to dispersion
that are orthogonal to innovations in the marginal product of capital.6 Conditional
on ￿xed time and ￿rm e⁄ects, the impulse response functions of the estimated model
show that positive dispersion shocks give rise to higher values of Tobin￿ s Q, higher
equity issuance, and higher real investment. This pattern is uniformly consistent with
5See also Park (2001).
6If disagreement increased by shocks to the investment opportunity set, then disagreement would
contain information about investment opportunities, and could thus explain the pattern observed in
aggregate means.
3the predictions of our model.
Finally, we compute variance decompositions to assess the quantitative importance
of dispersion shocks. As a fraction of the explainable variation in the data, we ￿nd that
dispersion shocks have a large impact on equity issuance, a modest impact on Tobin￿ s
Q, and a relatively small impact on real investment. In our model, large bubbles do
not necessarily imply large investment distortions. In our empirical ￿ndings, this is
in fact the case.
Recent research in ￿nance provides additional empirical support for our model
assumptions. Most notably, Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) report that high
dispersion forecasts low future returns. A portfolio of stocks in the highest quintile of
dispersion underperforms a portfolio of stocks in the lowest quintile of dispersion by
9.48% percent per year. Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) report related evidence. Instead
of using data on analysts￿forecasts, they de￿ne a measure of ￿breadth￿based on the
number of funds prevented from taking a short position due to legal constraints. They
￿nd that ￿short-constrained￿stocks have low future returns. Additional evidence on
the price e⁄ects of short-sale constraints is provided by Lamont and Jones (2002).
They show that stocks that were expensive to short during the 1920s and 30s deliv-
ered lower returns than other stocks. Using more recent data, Ofek and Richardson
(2003) report that the spring 2000 collapse of the internet bubble coincided with a
substantial supply of new shares created by the expiration of lock-up restrictions. Fi-
nally, D￿ Avolio￿ s (2003) detailed description of the market for borrowed stock provides
extensive direct evidence that short selling is costly.
Polk and Sapienza (2002) also attempt to measure the distortionary e⁄ect of stock
price bubbles on real investment. They argue that new equity issues, discretionary
earnings accruals, and lagged returns can be used as proxies for bubbles. Using
Tobin￿ s Q to control for investment opportunities, they ￿nd that, consistent with
their predictions, these bubble proxies enter positively and statistically signi￿cantly
4in a regression for investment.7 While many of their results are consistent with our
model predictions, our model also highlights a potential problem with their use of
the Q model as a framework for estimating the e⁄ects of bubbles on investment.
Namely, Tobin￿ s Q cannot be used to control for investment opportunities because Q
also depends on the bubble. In theory, this endogeneity problem is serious enough to
produce coe¢ cient estimates of the ￿wrong￿sign on the bubble proxy. Our empirical
strategy avoids this econometric problem by constructing a measure of exogenous
dispersion shocks.
Panageas (2004) similarly argues that Tobin￿ s Q cannot be used to proxy for in-
vestment opportunities. In his model, the marginal investor has in￿nite wealth. As a
result, share issuance has no marginal e⁄ect on price, new share issuance is indeter-
minate, and Tobin￿ s Q is a su¢ cient statistic for investment even in the presence of
bubbles. By contrast, in our model, the downward-sloping demand for shares drives
a wedge between average and marginal Q, and Tobin￿ s Q is no longer a su¢ cient
statistic for investment.
Evidence in favor of a downward sloping demand for shares is documented by
Asquith and Mullins (1986), who report that equity prices drop following announce-
ments of secondary stock o⁄erings. Additional evidence is o⁄ered in Scholes (1972)
and Holthausen et al. (1990), who study block trades, Shleifer (1986), who studies
additions to the S&P 500 index, and Loderer et al. (1991), who conclude that ￿on
balance, the evidence suggests that issuing ￿rms cannot treat the demand for their
stock as if it were perfectly elastic￿ .
Several other empirical papers are related in various ways. Motivated in part
by the possibility of bubbles in stock prices, M￿rck, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) and
Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993) compare the responsiveness of investment to
Tobin￿ s Q and fundamentals and broadly conclude that investment is driven primar-
7Polk and Sapienza (2002) also point out that abnormally high investment levels may be caused
in part by stock bubbles, in which case they should predict low subsequent returns. This is indeed
what they ￿nd.
5ily by fundamentals.8 Chirinko (1996) and Chirinko and Schaller (2001) implement
similar tests by including both fundamental and market Q measures, but conclude
instead that the evidence favors the existence of bubbles. Ericksonand Whited (1999)
and Bond and Cummins (2000) estimate investment-Q equations and speculate that
stock price bubbles are a likely source of measurement error in Tobin￿ s Q.9
In the remainder of the paper, we begin by exploring the implications for ￿rm
behavior of a simple equilibrium model of heterogeneous investor beliefs under short-
selling constraints. In section 3, we brie￿ y describe the data and econometric ap-
proach, followed by a description of our empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Model of Real Investment, Equity Issuance,
and Bubbles
In this section, we develop a simple model of ￿rm behavior when investors with
heterogeneous beliefs face short-selling constraints in the equity market. First, we
aggregate heterogenous portfolio demands and show that aggregate demand for new
shares is increasing in the degree of dispersion in beliefs. Second, we consider the share
issuance and real investment decisions of a rational manager who seeks to maximize
the objective value of the ￿rm on behalf of existing shareholders. We assume that
the manager is fully aware of the bubble and takes into account the e⁄ect of equity
issuance on the stock price when making such decisions.
We show that an increase in dispersion leads to an increase in the equilibrium
8Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2002) similarly ask whether some ￿rms are intrinsically more depen-
dent on equity for their external ￿nancing, and thus more sensitive to stock prices.
9Less closely related to ours are papers that examine the behavioral biases of executives rather
than market prices, and explores the potential impact on corporate investment decisions. Heaton
(1999) develops a model in which CEOs are both overcon￿dent and overoptimistic. Malmendier and
Tate (2002) use the timing of stock option exercise to measure overcon￿dence. Bertrand and Schoar
(2002) report evidence that CEOs appear to have managerial ￿styles￿that accompany them when
they change jobs. By contrast with these papers, we assume managers have rational (unbiased)
expectations.
6price bubble and an increase in net equity issuance. As a result, the user cost of
capital falls and investment increases. Finally, the rise in investment combined with
the increase in the bubble imply a higher equilibrium value of Tobin￿ s Q. We conclude
by discussing the model￿ s implications for empirical work.
2.1 The Demand for New Share Issues
We assume that an investor￿ s demand for shares is driven by the di⁄erence between
perceived value and current price. For simplicity, we rule out speculative demand
based on the di⁄erence between the current and likely future price of shares. In
contrast to investors, the manager￿ s beliefs about ￿rm value are unbiased. We refer
to this unbiased or objective assessment as the ￿rm￿ s ￿fundamental￿value, denoted
by V .
Heterogeneous investor valuations are denoted by vV , where v 2 [0;1] is a ran-
dom variable that measures idiosyncratic variation in investors beliefs. Let P denote
the market value (price) of the ￿rm. We assume the investor￿ s portfolio demand for
a ￿rm￿ s shares (i.e., the fraction of the investor￿ s wealth invested in the ￿rm) is given
by
!v = ￿ (vV ￿ P): (1)
This functional form for portfolio demand can be derived from a model in which
investors have CARA utility and fundamental value (V ) is normally distributed. In
this case, ￿ represents the constant of absolute risk aversion scaled by the variance of
fundamental value, and as such, may vary across ￿rms. Cross-￿rm variation in ￿ may
also arise owing to di⁄erences in attitudes toward risk, such as limits to diversi￿cation.
For example, ￿rms prone to agency problems may require less diversi￿ed investors
for incentive reasons and therefore a higher ￿:10 As we show below, the size of real
10Although a number of empirical studies attempt to compute the price elasticity of demand with
respect to share issues, these numbers are di¢ cult to interpret because it is di¢ cult to control for
news e⁄ects. We are not aware of any studies providing estimates from which we could infer the
7distortions depends on ￿.
Multiplying equation (1) by investor wealth, W, and dividing by the market value
of the ￿rm, P, translates the investor￿ s demand from a fraction of investor wealth to
a fraction of ￿rm value, nv = ￿W (vB￿1 ￿ 1), where B = P=V . We refer to B ￿the
ratio of price over fundamental value ￿as the bubble. Without loss of generality, we
assume W = 1.
Under short-selling constraints, the only investors who take non-zero positions
in the stock are those for whom vV ￿ P, or v ￿ B. Hence, assuming v has the
distribution function F (v;￿), the aggregate demand for shares is
n








To characterize this demand function we assume that v is log-normally distributed
with lnv ￿ N (￿0:5￿2;￿2); so that E (v) = 1. This normalization imposes the
assumption that average beliefs are unbiased. It also implies that net demand for
shares is zero when the ratio of price to fundamental value equals one and short-sale
constraints are not binding. Let ￿ and ￿ denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of the standard





Using properties of the log-normal distribution, equation (2) can be expressed as
n













8The ￿rst term in equation (4) measures the mass of market participants as a function
of the bubble B. The second term in equation (4), h(b)=h(b ￿ ￿), measures the
average demand conditional on market participation.11 Because the hazard rate is
strictly increasing, the ratio h(b)=h(b ￿ ￿) is greater than one, hence market demand
is strictly positive for B > 0: As the bubble increases, market participation falls,
while demand conditional on participation rises. On net, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates,
and demand for share falls.
We can invert the demand curve in equation (4) to solve for B as a function of the
number of shares issued. Denote the fraction of total shares supplied to the public by
n, and let B (n;￿) denote the inverse demand function. In a working paper version
of this paper, we show that this inverse demand curve slopes downward in the size of
the equity issue, and that it shifts outward in response to an increase in dispersion.12
Speci￿cally, the partial derivatives satisfy:
Bn =
￿B2
￿ (1 ￿ ￿(b ￿ ￿))
< 0; (5)
and
B￿ = Bh(b ￿ ￿) > 0: (6)
The derivatives in equations (5) and (6) lead to simple expressions for the re-
spective demand elasticities. In particular, the inverse-price elasticity of demand
￿n ￿ ￿@ lnB
@ lnn is




Since the ratio h(b ￿ ￿)=h(b) is bounded between zero and one, the inverse-demand




(1 ￿ ￿(b ￿ ￿))B￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(b))
￿
(see Johnson, Kotz and Balikrishnan (1994)). Equation 3 may be equivalently expressed as B =
￿(b ￿ ￿)=￿(b). Inserting this expression into nd(B;￿) yields the result.
12The appendix establishes a number of mathematical results used in this section.
9curve is inelastic over its entire range. The semi-elasticity of the bubble with respect
to dispersion, ￿￿ ￿ @ lnB
@￿ , is
￿￿ = h(b ￿ ￿).
The shift in demand caused by an increase in dispersion depends on the degree of
truncation, and hence the hazard rate of the normal distribution evaluated at the
bubble. To understand the implications of such a demand shift for investment, we
now turn to the ￿rm￿ s problem.
2.2 Equity Issuance and the Equilibrium Price Bubble
Given the inverse-demand function B (n;￿), we can now formally consider the ￿rm￿ s
problem. Let the expected value of installed capital, K, be given by
V (K) = E [￿(K;￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)K; (8)
where ￿ represents a shock to the pro￿tability of capital. To install new capital, the
￿rm incurs an adjustment cost 1
2 K2. We assume managers recognize mispricing
and choose K to maximize the true value of the ￿rm from the perspective of old
shareholders.13 Managers can ￿nance this investment using risk-free debt at the rate
r, or they can issue new equity by selling a fraction n of the ￿rm￿ s equity. They can
invest the proceeds in K, or pay them out as a dividend to the old shareholders. The
market value of equity is given by B (n;￿)V (K), so proceeds from new equity issues




nB (n;￿)V (K): (9)
13For example, managers might own a stake in the ￿rm for incentive reasons, in which case their
incentives are to act on behalf of old rather than new shareholders.











subject to equation (4). Note that the future value of the ￿rm in equation (10) is
multiplied by 1 ￿ n to re￿ ect the dilution of old shareholders.
The ￿rst-order condition for equity issuance derived from equation (10) implies:
B (n;￿) + nBn (n;￿) = 1. (11)
Applying the result that the inverse demand curve is downward sloping (Bn < 0), it
follows that the bubble satis￿es B > 1 when the ￿rm is issuing new shares (n > 0).
The ￿rm is a monopolist in the supply of its own shares, hence the share-issuance
decision is analogous to the standard monopoly problem. In equation (11) marginal
cost is unity while marginal bene￿t equals B (n;￿) + nBn (n;￿). These costs and
bene￿ts are proportional to V (K) which drops out of the equation.14 The result that
the bubble is positive in equilibrium is analogous to the result that a monopolist
always sets price above marginal cost. Thus a key feature of our model is that the
￿rm issues new shares but never drives the bubble down to its fundamental value.





14Because share issuance represents a dilution of the claims of existing share holders, the marginal
cost of issuance is proportional to V (K), the fundamental value of the ￿rm. Similarly, because
heterogenous beliefs are de￿ned relative to fundamental value, the marginal bene￿t of issuance is
also proportional to V (K).
15From the monopolist￿ s viewpoint, the bubble is analogous to the markup of price over marginal
cost, where the marginal cost of new share issues is unity. The equilibrium bubble in equation 11





11Equation (12) de￿nes a unique mapping B (￿), that is, for any ￿ > 0 there is a
unique equilibrium price B.16 Given the equilibrium price B(￿), the equilibrium
value of equity issuance is determined by
n(￿;￿) = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(b))(B (￿) ￿ 1): (13)
This equilibrium is depicted in ￿gure 1, which plots the market demand curve and
the marginal revenue curve for new equity issuance for the parameter values ￿ = 0:5
and ￿ = 1. Equilibrium equity issuance is denoted by n￿. For these parameter values,
the equilibrium stock price is overvalued by nearly 50%, and the ￿rm sells around
14% of its equity to the public. Note that the equilibrium stock price in equation
(12) is solely determined by the level of dispersion, whereas the equilibrium size of
the equity issues depends not only on dispersion but also on the parameter ￿. Thus,
for any size bubble, the size of the equity issue is arbitrarily small or large, depending
on the value of ￿.
We next consider the e⁄ect of an increase in dispersion on the equilibrium bubble




B (b[h(b ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ h(b))] + ￿ [h(b) ￿ b])
(￿ + [h(b ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ h(b)])
> 0: (14)
Thus an increase in dispersion causes an increase in the equilibrium size of the bub-
ble.17 We further establish that
dlnB
d￿
< h(b ￿ ￿) = ￿￿: (15)
16Equation 12 implies that the equilibrium value B (￿) is independent of other model parameters,
notably the demand parameter ￿. Thus, a monopolist facing a demand curve of the form speci￿ed
in equation 4 chooses a constant markup that only depends on demand characteristics through ￿;
the degree of consumer heterogeneity. This result can be applied to a variety of consumer settings
characterized by a log-normal distribution of underlying demand characteristics.
17To establish the inequality dB
d￿ > 0 we rely on the fact that the hazard rate h(b) is log-concave
so that h(b ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ h(b) > 0. See the appendix for full details of the derivation of equations 14
and 15.
12Figure 1: Equilibrium share price (B) and share issuance (n).

















In words, the equilibrium response of the bubble to an increase in dispersion is less
than the implied elasticity obtained from the demand curve. Intuitively, a ￿rm issues
new equity in response to an increase in dispersion, partially o⁄setting the e⁄ect of
a rise in ￿ on price. To formally see the e⁄ect of an increase in dispersion on equity




[(1 ￿ ￿(b ￿ ￿))]
B
￿





In Figure 2, we show the e⁄ect of an increase in dispersion from ￿ = 0:5 to
￿ = 0:7. This causes an outward shift in the market demand for shares and increases
the equilibrium size of the bubble. It also increases the fraction of equity issued
(from n￿ to n￿￿). As shown in equation (13), equity issuance depends on both the
average demand per participant, ￿ (B ￿ 1), and the percentage of market participants,
1￿￿(b). In our model, the rise in demand per participant increases enough to o⁄set
13Figure 2: The e⁄ect of an increase in dispersion.




















the drop in market participation, and an increase in dispersion causes an increase in
share issuance.
2.3 Investment and the Cost of Capital
A convenient feature of our model formulation is that it allows us to consider the
equilibrium behavior of share issuance and stock pricing without directly consider-
ing the ￿rm￿ s investment decision. As we now show, in equilibrium, an increase in
dispersion leads to a lower cost of capital and an increase in investment.
The ￿rst-order condition with respect to capital (from the ￿rm￿ s problem in equa-
tions (9) and ( 10)) implies the (modi￿ed) Q equation
1 +  K =
1 + n(B ￿ 1)
1 + r
Vk: (17)
14For the case where there is no bubble (B ￿ 1), equation (17) simpli￿es to 1 +  K =
1
1+rVk. This is the usual ￿rst-order condition for investment, which says that the ￿rm
invests up to the point where the marginal cost of investment, 1 +  K, equals the
discounted expected marginal value of capital, 1
1+rVk (or marginal Q).
To see the e⁄ect of the bubble on investment, we ￿rst consider the case of no




1 + n(B ￿ 1)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿): (18)
This expression allows us to interpret the e⁄ect of bubbles in terms of the Jorgensonian
cost of capital, which is de￿ned as the right side of equation (18). When n(B ￿ 1) is
zero, that is, when there is no bubble, or when there is a bubble but the ￿rm does not
issue, we have the familiar optimality condition for capital which sets the expected
marginal pro￿tability of capital equal to its user cost. That is, E [￿k] = r + ￿.
If, however, the bubble is positive and the ￿rm actively exploits the bubble by
issuing shares, then this has the e⁄ect of reducing the cost of capital. Assume r =
0:10 and ￿ = 0:10, so that in the absence of bubbles, the baseline cost of capital is
20%. Consider again the numerical example illustrated in ￿gure 1. Here, the level of
dispersion is ￿ = 0:5, which causes an equilibrium bubble of B = 1:4, and optimal
equity issuance of n = 0:14. Then according to equation (18), the bubble reduces the
Jorgensonian cost of capital from 20% to 14:2%. This distortion depends not only
on the size of the bubble but also on the size of new share issues. To see this, reduce
the value of ￿ by half (to ￿ = 0:5). The magnitude of bubble is identical (B = 1:4),
but now it is optimal for the ￿rm to issue only half as much equity issue as it issued
before (n = 0:07 instead of n = 0:14). For the same size bubble, the distortion is
smaller; the Jorgensonian cost of capital is reduced from 20% to 17:0%. In short, as
shown in equation (18) and illustrated in this example, the magnitude of the bubble
is not su¢ cient to reveal the distortion of the cost of capital. Firms with small ￿ have
little incentive to issue new shares. For such ￿rms, large bubbles could theoretically
15persist in equilibrium while having only a small impact on the cost of capital.
Finally, we consider the e⁄ect of dispersion on investment. In the more general
case of non-zero adjustment costs for investment, equation (18) can be written:
E(￿k) + 1 ￿ ￿
1 +  K
=
1 + r
1 + n(B ￿ 1)
: (19)
Assuming that the expected marginal pro￿t of capital, E(￿k), is weakly decreasing
in K, it follows immediately that the right side of this equation is monotonically
decreasing in K. Since an increase in dispersion causes the equilibrium values of B
and n to increase, this leads to a rise in investment.
2.4 Tobin￿ s Q
We now consider the relation between dispersion, investment and Tobin￿ s Q in equi-
librium. This analysis is important because previous empirical work on bubbles and
real investment relies on the Q framework to control for investment opportunities.
This can lead to misleading inference because Tobin￿ s Q is itself a function of the
bubble.18 Our model can be used to illustrate this point explicitly.
Tobin￿ s Q is de￿ned as the ratio of the market value of equity to the replacement









Following Hayashi (1982), we assume pro￿ts are homogenous of degree one, or ￿(K;￿) =
￿K. It follows that Vk = V=K = ￿ + 1 ￿ ￿. In this case, according to equation (20),
Q depends positively on ￿ through B. In other words, the value of Tobin￿ s Q re￿ ects
not just shocks to investment opportunities, but also the bubble itself.
The relationship between investment and Tobin￿ s Q can be derived by combining
18We are grateful to Andy Abel for particularly useful comments on this point.
16the ￿rst-order condition for investment (equation (17)), the de￿nition of Tobin￿ s Q
(equation (20)), and our assumption of linear homogeneity. This yields:
1 +  K =
1 + n(B ￿ 1)
B
Q: (21)
This equation is the familiar Q equation, but with a new term, [1 + n(B ￿ 1)]=B,
which depends negatively on dispersion. In an investment regression that conditions
on Tobin￿ s Q, a proxy for bubbles would pick up the variation due to the term
[1 + n(B ￿ 1)]=B. This coe¢ cient is theoretically negative, which would misleadingly
suggest that higher bubbles cause lower investment.
To summarize the results in this section, heterogeneous beliefs and short-selling
constraints can generate bubbles. When the distribution of investor valuations is log-
normal, increases in dispersion increase both the size of the bubble and the amount of
new equity issued. This lowers the cost of capital and therefore stimulates investment.
The bubble alone is not su¢ cient for determining the magnitude of this distortion.
Rather, it is the interaction between the bubble and the fraction of new equity issued
that matters. Finally, we show that the equilibrium value of Tobin￿ s Q is increasing
in not only the rate of investment but also in the size of the bubble. Thus, our re-
sults provide support for the common practice of using Tobin￿ s Q (or market-to-book
ratios) as indirect measures of stock price bubbles. By the same logic, our model cau-
tions against using Tobin￿ s Q as a proxy for investment opportunities when testing
for the e⁄ects of bubbles on real investment.
3 Empirical Analysis
To evaluate the empirical predictions of the model we focus on the predicted causal
relation running from our proxy for the dispersion of beliefs to investment, Tobin￿ s Q,
and net equity issuance. We ￿rst compare trends in dispersion, new equity issues, To-
17bin￿ s Q and investment over the period 1986-2000.19 We divide ￿rms into those listed
on the New York Stock Exchange versus Nasdaq, because the stock price movements
of the latter are commonly thought to have been driven by bubbles (more so than
the former). We then consider a more detailed analysis of the data at the ￿rm-level
where we can more easily control for ￿rms￿investment opportunities.
The discussion in the previous section highlights the di¢ cult identi￿cation issues
presented by the Q framework. Speci￿cally, because net equity issuance, Tobin￿ s Q,
and real investment all respond endogenously to dispersion, one cannot econometri-
cally identify the existence or magnitude of bubbles by regressing real investment on
Tobin￿ s Q and new share issues. Our empirical strategy addresses this identi￿cation
problem by pursuing two ideas. First, we use the variance of analysts￿earnings fore-
cast to proxy for the dispersion of investor opinion about a ￿rm￿ s stock value. This
variable is an ideal proxy because according our model, it solely determines the mag-
nitude of the bubble in equilibrium. It is furthermore desirable because in contrast to
bubble proxies used in previous research (e.g., equity issues or lagged stock returns),
there is no obvious reason why dispersion should be correlated with investment op-
portunities. Second, in our ￿rm-level analysis, we use recursively ordered VARs to
further isolate and identify the exogenous component of this variable. This approach
is a (minimally) structural attempt to improve identi￿cation.
We assemble annual, ￿rm-level data from two sources. First, we use Compustat
to construct both aggregate and ￿rm-level measures of the rate of investment, It=Kt,
net new equity issuance as a fraction of total equity, neqt, Tobin￿ s Q ratio, Qt, and
the marginal product of capital, mpkt. The appendix provides more complete details
on the construction of these variables.
Second, we use data on analysts￿earnings forecasts available from IBES to con-
struct aggregate and ￿rm-level measures of the dispersion of investor opinion. Diether,
Malloy and Scherbina (2002) show that historical IBES data su⁄er from measurement
19This time frame is set by data availability.
18errors induced by the truncation of signi￿cant digits. To ￿x this problem, they collect
original source data from IBES, which they graciously shared with us. Unfortunately,
these data do not extend beyond the year 2000. Therefore, to maximize the length
of our time series, we use the standard IBES data in our aggregate analysis (these
data extend through 2002). At the ￿rm level, however, we use the bias-free IBES
data because the added time dimension is not as critical, whereas the bias identi￿ed
by Diether et al.. is potentially severe.
At the ￿rm level, our annual proxy for dispersion exploits all of the forecasts issued
by analysts over the year. We de￿ne dispersion as the logarithm of the ￿scal year
average of the monthly standard deviation of analysts￿forecasts of earnings per share,







where Nt￿j is the number of shares outstanding, and SDt￿j is the standard deviation
of the per-share earnings forecasts for all analysts making forecasts for month j (we
use the value of SDt as reported on the IBES summary tape).
Finally, to reduce the e⁄ect of outliers, we set the variables It=Kt, Qt, dt, and
mpkt to missing if their values are below zero or higher than their 99th percentile;
neqt is trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We drop observations for which the
lag between consecutive ￿scal-year-ends is not exactly 12 months. In total, our ￿rm-
level sample contains 22522 non-missing ￿rm-year observations, of which 18421 have
non-missing values for the ￿rst two lags, too. Our aggregate variables are constructed
by taking equal-weighted averages of the ￿rm-level data.
3.1 The 1990￿ s boom: Nasdaq versus NYSE
Figure 3 plots the time-series averages of dispersion, Tobin￿ s Q, the sales to capital
ratio (a measure of MPK), the investment rate and net equity issuance for the sub-
19samples of ￿rms listed on Nasdaq versus NYSE over the period 1990-2002.20 For
comparison￿ s sake, we also plot the Nasdaq versus NYSE stock price indices as well.
Nasdaq ￿rms experienced a steady increase in dispersion relative to NYSE ￿rms
over the period 1990-2001, followed by a slight decline in 2002.21 Nasdaq ￿rms expe-
rienced a steady increase in their investment rate relative to NYSE ￿rms over most of
this period. Nasdaq ￿rms also show a relatively sharp increase in both Tobin￿ s Q and
net equity issuance during the later part of the boom. This sharp increase coincides
with a rise in the growth rate of dispersion for the 1998-2001 period. Although tim-
ing between these variables is not exact, the latter part of the 1990￿ s is characterized
by sharp increases in dispersion, Tobin￿ s Q, net equity issuance, and investment for
Nasdaq ￿rms relative to NYSE ￿rms. These patterns are broadly consistent with our
model￿ s predictions.
The divergence in investment rates between Nasdaq and NYSE ￿rms is di¢ cult to
explain based on investment fundamentals alone (as measured by the sales to capital
ratio). In fact, during the early sample period, there is little di⁄erence between the
marginal product of capital for NYSE versus Nasdaq ￿rms. Then in 1999, MPK for
Nasdaq ￿rms begins to collapse while dispersion, Tobin￿ s Q, new equity issuance,
and investment all continue to rise. This is all consistent with the bubble view.
To provide additional insight we now consider an empirical analysis based on the
microeconometric data.
20With the exception of the net-equity issuance, we report the mean of the log of all variables for
each sub-sample. For all variables, we trim outliers using a 1% cuto⁄ rule applied to the combined
NYSE and Nasdaq sample.
21Because of reporting issues with IBES vs Compustat, we lose approximately 20% of our ob-
servations in the last year of the sample. Thus the mean dispersion estimates for 2002 may not
be entirely representative. Consistent with the idea that increases in dispersion contributed to the
stock market boom, using medians rather than means, we see a sharper reduction in dispersion in
the last year of our sample.
203.2 Panel Data VAR Analysis
We start with a three-variable VAR system, estimated in logs, that includes the
marginal product of capital, dispersion and investment. To allow for the possibility
that dispersion may contain information about current investment opportunities, we
consider the e⁄ect of an innovation to dispersion that is uncorrelated with the in-
novation to MPK.22 Hence, when computing impulse responses, we use a Choleski
decomposition using the ordering mpkt, dt, It=Kt.23
Table 1 reports the coe¢ cient values of this three-variable VAR system. Table 1
also reports the t-statistics for the coe¢ cients.24 Consistent with a key implication of
our model, we observe a statistically signi￿cant positive link between dispersion and
investment, controlling for the marginal product of capital. The marginal product of
capital is also highly signi￿cant in the investment equation, as we would expect. We
also see a positive relation between dispersion and mpk, a ￿nding which suggests that
our orthogonalization scheme will be helpful when identifying increases in dispersion
that are not related to fundamentals.
Figure 4 reports the impulse response functions from this three-variable VAR. We
report the e⁄ects of shocks to mpkt which we interpret as a shock to the fundamental
investment opportunities of the ￿rm, and we report the e⁄ects of a shock to dispersion,
22Dispersion would contain information about investment opportunities if shocks to fundamentals
trigger disagreement among analysts.
23Formally, we estimate the model yit = Ayit￿1 +fi +et +vit, where yit = fmpkit;dit;Iit=Kitg
0,
A is a 3 ￿ 3 matrix of coe¢ cients, fi is a vector of ￿xed ￿rm e⁄ects, and et is a vector of common
time shocks. We estimate the model following the procedure described in Arellano and Bover (1995).
Our ordering for the three-variable case implies that the vector of residuals vit is related to a set of





























24We do not report R2 statistics because we estimate the model using instrumental variables.
21which, within the context of our model leads to an increase in the bubble (price relative
to fundamentals).
The e⁄ect of a one-standard deviation shock to mpkt is reported in the ￿rst row
of Figure 4. The immediate e⁄ect of the shock is to increase both mpkt and invest-
ment by approximately the same magnitude (0.2), following which both variables
return to steady-state at approximately the same rate. This ￿nding implies a unit
elasticity between investment and the marginal product of capital following a shock
to fundamentals.
The e⁄ect of a one standard deviation shock to dispersion is reported in the second
row of Figure 4. Consistent with our model, an innovation to dispersion leads to a
pronounced increase in investment. The peak response of investment is on the order
of 0.1 percent and occurs in the year following the shock. The increase in dispersion
also causes a rise in mpkt but the magnitude is relatively small. Using unit elasticity
as a reasonable measure of how investment should respond to fundamentals, most
of the increase in investment following a shock to dispersion can be attributed to
changes in dispersion that are orthogonal to future mpk.25
To examine the empirical link between dispersion, Tobin￿ s Q and net equity
issuance, we add these variables to the baseline VAR. For parsimony, we focus
on the impulse response functions rather than coe¢ cient values.26 We again con-
sider innovations based on a Cholesky decomposition using the following ordering:
[mpkt;dt;I=Kt;Qt;neqt]: The results are reported in Figure 5.
25If we interpret approximately unit elasticity response of of investment to the innovation in mpk as
providing a reasonable measure of how investment responds to fundamentals, then we would attribute
1/3 (0.03 out of 0.1) of the rise in investment to fundamentals following a shock to dispersion. The
remaining 2/3 response (0.07 out of 0.1) would be attributable to movements in dispersion not linked
to fundamentals.
26Our model suggests that in a regression of investment on Tobin￿ s Q and dispersion, we should
￿nd a negative e⁄ect of dispersion on investment. Adding Tobin￿ s Q to the investment equation
reduces the coe¢ cient on dispersion but they remain positive. Because such regressions do not
control for the contemporaneous correlations however, we do not necessarily interpret this as a
rejection of the model. Rather, it highlights the need for additional identi￿cation through the
choleski decomposition.
22The impulse response to a one standard deviation shock to mpkt is reported in
the ￿rst row of Figure 5. Adding the additional variables does not change the basic
relation between fundamentals and investment that we observed in Figure 4. A shock
to mpkt leads to a modest rise in Tobin￿ s Q and a small increase in equity issuance
upon impact of the shock. Both of these responses are consistent with the notion
that Tobin￿ s Q and equity issuance respond endogenously to fundamental investment
opportunities.
The response of investment and fundamentals to an innovation in dispersion is
also similar to the results obtained using the three-variable VAR system albeit slightly
weaker. Investment responds with some lag and shows a peak response on the order
of 0.08. The increase in mpkt is again positive but relatively small in magnitude ￿on
the order of 0.04. Again, using unit elasticity as a benchmark, this ￿nding suggests
that slightly less than half of the response of investment to the dispersion shock can
be explained by the response of fundamentals, the other half is attributable to a
non-fundamental component and is therefore consistent with the notion that bubbles
drive investment.
The innovation to dispersion leads to an increase in Tobin￿ s Q and a rise in equity
issuance ￿both of these responses are consistent with the model￿ s predictions. They
are also large in magnitude relative to the investment response. Following a shock
to mpkt, the peak increase in Tobin￿ s Q is one third the size of the peak increase in
investment. In contrast, following a shock to dispersion, the peak increase in Tobin￿ s
Q is nearly the same size as the increase in investment. Our model implies that in
the absence of bubbles, investment is a su¢ cient statistic for Tobin￿ s Q regardless of
the source of the shock. In the presence of bubbles, Tobin￿ s Q should re￿ ect both the
increase in investment and the increase in the bubble however (see equation (21)).
This additional impact on Q through the bubble, controlling for investment implies
that Qt should respond more to dispersion shocks, controlling for investment. Our
model thus rationalizes the ￿nding that ￿lnQt=￿ln(It=Kt) is larger in response to
23shocks to dispersion relative to shocks to mpkt.
In both the three-variable and the ￿ve-variable VAR results, innovations in dis-
persion cause increases in investment, Tobin￿ s Q, and net equity issuance that are
consistent with our model predictions. Identi￿cation is complicated by the tendency
of mpkt to respond positively to increases in dispersion, but the response is relatively
weak, suggesting that most of the movement in investment, Q and net equity issuance
following a shock to dispersion can be attributed to non-fundamental components,
i.e. bubbles.
Although not reported, we also consider the e⁄ects of a shock to Tobin￿ s Q that
is orthogonal to mpkt and dispersion. Such a shock also causes an increase in Tobin￿ s
Q, investment, and net equity issuance, but a pronounced fall in mpkt. The drop
in mpkt is inconsistent with the view that these impulse responses re￿ ect a rise in
fundamentals. It is, however, consistent with the view that the orthogonalized shock
to Tobin￿ s Q re￿ ect a reduction in the cost of capital. Such variation in Tobin￿ s Q
may re￿ ect time-variation in covariance risk, or it may re￿ ect movements in bubbles
not driven by dispersion.
To assess the quantitative importance of these results, we compute a variance
decomposition of the ￿ve-variable VAR based on the above ordering. We report results
at the 10-year horizon; similar results are obtained at shorter horizons. Because we
control for time dummies and ￿xed e⁄ects in our panel-data framework, these variance
decompositions provide information about the within-￿rm variation only, and hence
cannot be used to quantify the importance of bubbles in the aggregate.
Table 2 reveals that most of the variation in each variable is determined by its
own shock. The exception is investment, for which fundamentals play the dominant
role. Dispersion explains only a small fraction of the total variance of investment.
When compared to the fraction explained by Tobin￿ s Q (7.5 percent), this number
is reasonably large however. Dispersion also explains 1.5 percent of the variation in
mpk and Tobin￿ s Q. Interestingly, dispersion accounts for more of the variance of net
24equity issuance (6 percent) than any other variable besides net equity issuance itself.
In the absence of mispricing, the ￿rm is indi⁄erent between equity issuance and other
forms of ￿nance. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that dispersion would account
for a reasonable fraction of the variation in share issuance.
The variance decompositions suggest that dispersion only accounts for a small
fraction of investment. This ￿nding is not surprising for several reasons. First, as
mentioned above, our panel data estimates do not identify the macro variation in the
bubble component.27 Second, analysts are reasonably informed agents. Dispersion in
analysts forecasts is therefore likely to understate the true amount of disagreement
in the market place. Finally, the model itself implies that the e⁄ect of bubbles on
investment will be limited, since the ￿rm is unwilling to fully exploit the bubble in
equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
Building on Miller (1977) and Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), we develop a model
in which increases in dispersion of investor opinion cause stock prices to rise above
their fundamental values. We consider the optimal share issuance and investment
decisions of rational managers in response to such mispricing. Our model predicts
that an increase in dispersion causes increases in Tobin￿ s Q, net new share issues, and
real investment. We test these predictions using the variance of analysts￿earnings
forecasts to proxy for shocks to the dispersion of investor beliefs. This proxy e⁄ectively
allows us to identify a portion of the bubble component in Tobin￿ s Q. Using a recursive
ordering of a panel data VAR for identi￿cation, we ￿nd that shocks to dispersion have
positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on Tobin￿ s Q, net equity issuance, and real
investment. These results con￿rm the model￿ s key predictions.
27Our aggregate plots, though anecdotal, suggest that the distortion caused by dispersion could
be more substantial than our panel data estimates suggest.
25Substantial room for future research remains. It would be desirable to extend our
model to allow for the endogenous formation of beliefs (as in Scheinkman and Xiong,
2003, for example). Extending our model to include debt issuance may help explain
the capital structure dynamics documented in Baker and Wurgler (2003). Finally,
adding investment dynamics would provide a more suitable structural framework for
quantifying the real e⁄ects of bubbles.
265 Bibliography
Allen, F., S. Morris, and H.S. Shin, 2003, ￿Beauty contests and iterated expectations
in asset markets,￿Working Paper, Yale University.
Arellano, M. and O. Bover, 1995, ￿Another look at the instrumental variable esti-
mation of error component models,￿Journal of Econometrics 68, 29-51.
Asquith, P. and D.W. Mullins, 1986, ￿Equity issues and o⁄ering dilution,￿Journal
of Financial Economics 15, 61-89.
Baker, M., J. Stein, and J. Wurgler, 2003, ￿When does the market matter? Stock
prices and the investment of equity dependent ￿rms,￿ Quarterly Journal of
Economics 118, 969-1006.
Baker, M. and J. Wurgler, 2002, Market timing and capital structure, Journal of
Finance 57, 1-32.
Bertrand, M. and A. Schoar, 2002, ￿Managing with style: The e⁄ect of managers on
￿rm policies,￿Working Paper, MIT.
Blanchard, O.J., C. Rhee, and L. Summers, 1993, ￿The stock market, pro￿t and
investment,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 115-136.
Bond, S.R. and J.G. Cummins, 2000, ￿Noisy share prices and the q model of invest-
ment,￿Working Paper No. W01/22, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.
Chen, J., H. Hong, and J.C. Stein, 2002, ￿Breadth of ownership and stock returns,￿
Journal of Financial Economics 66, 171-205.
Chirinko, R.S., 1996, ￿Bubbles, fundamentals, and investment: A multiple equation
testing strategy,￿Journal of Monetary Economics 38, 47-76.
Chirinko, R.S. and H. Schaller, 2001, ￿Business ￿xed investment and ￿ bubbles￿ : The
Japanese case,￿American Economic Review 91, 663-680.
Diether, K.B., C.J. Malloy, and A. Scherbina, 2002, ￿Di⁄erences of opinion and the
cross-section of stocks returns,￿Journal of Finance 57, 2113-2141.
D￿ Avolio, G.D., 2002, ￿The market for borrowing stock,￿Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 66, 271-306.
Du¢ e, D., N. Garleanu and L. Pedersen, 2001, ￿Securities lending, shorting, and
pricing,￿Journal of Financial Economics 66, 307-339.
Erickson, T. and T. Whited, 1999, ￿Measurement error and the relation between
investment and q,￿Journal of Political Economy 108, 1027-1057.
27Gilchrist, S., and C.P. Himmelberg, 1998, ￿Investment, Fundamentals, and Fi-
nance,￿In B. Bernanke and J.J. Rotemberg, eds., NBER Macroeconomics An-
nual (MIT Press, Cambridge).
Hayashi, F., 1982, ￿Tobin￿ s marginal q and average q: A neoclassical interpretation,￿
Econometrica 50, 213-224.
Heaton, J. B., 1999, ￿Managerial optimism and corporate ￿nance,￿Working Paper,
University of Chicago.
Hirshleifer, D., 2001, ￿Investor psychology and asset pricing,￿Journal of Finance
56, 1533-1597.
Holthausen, R., Leftwich, R. and D. Mayers, 1990, ￿Large block transactions, the
speed of response, and temporary and permanent stock-price e⁄ects,￿Journal
of Financial Economics 26, 71-95.
Hong, H., and J.C. Stein, 2003, ￿Di⁄erences of opinion, short-sales constraints and
market crashes,￿Review of Financial Studies 16, 487-525.
Huberman, G., and T. Regev, 2001, "Contagious speculation and a cure for cancer:
A non-event that made stock prices soar," Journal of Finance 56, 387-396.
Johnson, N.L., S. Kotz, and N. Balakrishnan, 1994, Continous univariate distribu-
tions, Vol. 1, Second edition (John Wiley & Sons, New York).
Jones, C. and O. Lamont, 2002, ￿Short-sale constraints and stock returns,￿Journal
of Financial Economics 66, 207￿ 39.
Keynes, J.M., 1936, The general theory of employment, interest and money (Macmil-
lan, London).
Lakonishok, J., A. Shleifer, and R.V. Vishny, 1994, ￿Contrarian investment, extrap-
olation and risk,￿Journal of Finance 49, 1541-1578.
Loderer, C., J.W. Cooney and L.D. Van Drunen, 1991, ￿The Price Elasticity of
Demand for Common Stock￿ , Journal of Finance 46, 621-651.
Malmendier, U., and G. Tate, 2001, ￿CEO overcon￿dence and corporate invest-
ment,￿Working Paper, Harvard University.
Miller, E.M., 1977, ￿Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion,￿Journal of Fi-
nance 32, 1151-1168.
M￿rck, R., A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny, 1990, ￿The stock market and investment:
Is the market a sideshow?￿Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 0, 157-202.
28M￿rck, R., A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny, 1990, ￿Do managerial objectives drive bad
acquisitions?￿Journal of Finance 45, 31-48.
Ofek, E. and M. Richardson, 2003, ￿Dotcom mania: The rise and fall of internet
stock prices,￿Journal of Finance 58, 1113￿ 1137.
Panageas, Stavros, 2004, ￿Speculation, overpricing, and investment ￿theory and
empirical evidence,￿MIT Mimeo.
Park, C., 2001, ￿Stock returns and the dispersion in earnings forecasts,￿Working
Paper No. 0117, Department of Economics, National University of Singapore.
Polk, C. and P. Sapienza, 2002, ￿The real e⁄ects of investor sentiment,￿Working
Paper, Northwestern University.
Scheikman, J. and W. Xiong, 2003, ￿Overcon￿dence and bubbles,￿The Journal of
Political Economy 111, 1183-1219.
Scholes, Myron S., 1972, The market for securities: Substitution versus price pressure
and the e⁄ects of information on share prices, Journal of Business 45, 179-211.
Shleifer, A., 1986, ￿Do demand curves for stocks slope down?￿Journal of Finance
41, 579-590.
Shleifer, A., 2000, Ine¢ cient markets: An introduction to behavioral ￿nance (Oxford
University Press, Oxford).
Shleifer, A. and R.V. Vishny, 1997, ￿The limits of arbitrage,￿Journal of Finance
52, 35-55.
Stein, J.C., 1996, ￿Rational capital budgeting in an irrational world,￿Journal of
Business 69, 429-455.
29A Appendix: Model Results
A.1 Properties of the Inverse Demand Curve
We ￿rst use equation 4 combined with equation 3 to establish the limiting behavior
of the demand curve. We then compute and sign the derivatives Bn and B￿. It is
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To compute the upper limit, we note that @b
@B = 1
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Thus we have that limB!0 nd(B;￿) = 1 and limB!1 nd(B;￿) = 0. We now compute
















By the properties of the lognormal, ￿(b ￿ ￿) = ￿(b)B. Hence the ￿rst term in this
expression is zero, so that
@n
@B
= ￿￿ [1 ￿ ￿(b ￿ ￿)]B
￿2 < 0. (25)
The limiting conditions in equations 23 and 24 and the derivative in equation 25
establish that the market demand curve in equation 4 is invertible with
Bn =
￿B2
￿ [1 ￿ ￿(b ￿ ￿)]
< 0:
To compute B￿ = @B



























Substituting in our expression for Bn, we obtain
B￿ = Bh(b ￿ ￿) > 0.
A.2 Derivation of the Equilbrium Price
To show that a unique solution to equation 12 exists, we use equation 3 to express






The left-hand-side of this equation is strictly positive and monotonically increas-
ing in b. The hazard rate for the standard normal h(b) is monotonically increasing
so that
h(b)

























(h(b) ￿ h(b ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿) < 0;
Log-concavity of h(x) implies that (h(b) ￿ h(b ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿) < 0 which establishes the
inequality (see the appendix of Gilchrist and Williams, 2001). These results are
su¢ cient to guarantee a unique equilibrium value of b and hence B for equation
12: The uniqueness of the equilibrium value n(￿;￿) for equity issuance, equation 13,
follows directly from these results.
A.3 The E⁄ect of an Increase in Dispersion on Price and
Equity Issuance
Before analyzing the equilibrium response of B and n to an increase in dispersion,











> 0 for ￿ > 0.
31To obtain the inequality, we note that at ￿ = 0, the term in brackets on the right-hand-
side of this expression is identically zero. This term is also strictly increasing in ￿ and
therefore positive for ￿ > 0. Thus at b = ￿ we have
h(b)
h(b￿￿) > B. Since h(b)=h(b￿￿) is
decreasing in b and B = exp(b￿0:5￿2
￿ ) is increasing in b, the equilibrium must therefore
occur at b > ￿.
We now totally di⁄erentiate equation (12) to obtain dB
d￿. For short-hand notation,
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> 0: (26)
Again, log-concavity of the hazard rate implies that h(b ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ h(b) > 0 so that
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< h(b ￿ ￿):
To compute dn
d￿, we use equation 22 and equation 12 to provide an alternative
expression for equity issuance in equilibrium:
n = ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿(b ￿ ￿))B
￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(b))
￿
. (27)
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B Appendix: Data construction
We assemble annual, ￿rm-level data from two sources. Data on sales, capital expen-
ditures, net cash ￿ ows from equity issuance, total assets, total liabilities, preferred
equity, and property, plant and equipment are obtained from Standard & Poors Com-
pustat. These variables are merged with a custom data extract on analysts forecasts
provided by IBES to Deither, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) (and kindly provided to
33us by Anna Scherbina). In contrast to the usual IBES data, the data used in Deither
et al. do not su⁄er from measurement errors caused by the truncation of signi￿cant
digits (see their paper for further details). Variable de￿nitions are as follows.
￿ Investment (It=Kt) is the ratio of capital expenditures to beginning-of-period
net book value of property, plant and equipment.
￿ Marginal pro￿t of capital (mpkt, or ￿MPK￿ ) is the logarithm of a standardized
ratio of sales divided by lagged book value of property, plant and equipment
(end-of-￿scal-year values). Before taking logs, the sales-to-capital is divided by
the industry average ratio (computed on a sample trimmed at the one percent
tails), and then multiplied by 0.2. This standardization accomodates cross-
industry di⁄erences in the ￿xed capital share of production, and reduces the
chance of misclassifying ratios in low-capital industries as ￿outliers.￿In steady
state, MPK should equal the long-run cost of capital, r + ￿. Normalizing the
scaled ratio by r + ￿ = 0:2 thus centers the sample average of MPK at a
reasonable value, but obviously has no e⁄ect on the statisticaly properties of
our estimates. For details, see Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998).
￿ Dispersion (dt) is the logarithm of the ￿scal year average of the monthly stan-
dard deviation of analysts￿forecasts of earnings per share, times the number of







where Nt￿j is the number of shares outstanding, and SDt￿j is the standard
deviation of the per-share earnings forecasts for all analysts making forecasts
for month j (we use the value of SDt as reported on the IBES summary tape).
The standard deviation is computed by IBES using only those forecasts that
have been recently updated.
￿ Net equity issuance (neqt) is cash from new share issues minus cash used for
share repurchases during the ￿scal year divided by the beginning-of-period mar-
ket value of equity (and multiplied by 100).
￿ Tobin￿ s Q; (Qt) is the market value of equity plus the book value of preferred
equity plus the book value of total liabilities divided by beginning-of-period
book value of total assets.
The variables It=Kt, Qt, dt, and mpkt are set to missing if their values are below zero
or higher than their 99th percentile; neqt is trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Trimming reduces the impact of extreme values which are common for ratios in ￿rm
panels drawn from accounting data. The use of logs (where possible) also mitigates
34this problem. We drop observations for which the lag between consecutive ￿scal-year-
ends is not exactly 12 months. (The month in which the ￿scal years sometimes changes
for such reasons as mergers or restructurings.) Our ￿nal sample size is constrained
by the availability of IBES data. From 1979 through 1985, sample size rises from 54
to 95. (Excluding these early years from our sample does not change our results).
In 1986, the sample size rises sharply to 1185 ￿rms, and then increases more or less
steadily to 1771 ￿rms in year 2000. In total, our sample contains 22522 non-missing
￿rm-year observations, of which 18421 have non-missing values for the ￿rst two lags,
too. Table A reports summary statistics on the full sample.
Table A: Summary Statistics
Percentiles
Variable Mean S.D. Min 25th 50th 75th Max
lnmpkt 22522 -1.786 0.712 -6.086 -2.181 -1.809 -1.426 3.249
lndt 22522 0.383 1.370 -5.495 -0.538 0.280 1.231 7.065
ln(It=Kt) 22522 -1.341 0.912 -7.131 -1.897 -1.365 -0.800 4.922
lnQt 22522 0.542 0.585 -1.548 0.154 0.417 0.836 4.694
lnneqt 22522 0.012 0.137 -1.188 -0.008 0.000 0.000 8.068
Finally, the IBES data provided by Deither et al. e⁄ectively end in 2000. To con-
struct aggregate means through 2002, we instead use standard IBES data. Comparing
overlapping data in the pre-2001 period shows that annual means are not sensitive to
the truncation issues.
35Table 1
Estimates of Three-Variable VAR
lnmpkt lndt ln(I=K)t
lnmpkt￿1 0:933 0:436 0:459
(30:408) (10:920) (9:523)
lnmpkt￿2 ￿0:093 ￿0:229 ￿0:308
(4:117) (7:267) (8:647)
lndt￿1 0:044 0:531 0:091
(3:996) (27:754) (4:322)
lndt￿2 0:029 0:121 0:097
(4:871) (10:582) (7:948)
ln(I=K)t￿1 ￿0:164 ￿0:080 0:459
(13:763) (4:416) (22:042)
ln(I=K)t￿2 0:052 0:087 0:134
(5:972) (6:416) (8:266)
Notes: Robust t-statistics appear in parentheses.
Sample contains 18421 ￿rm-year observations.
36Table 2
Variance Decomposition at 10-Year Horizon
Fraction of Total Variance Explained
Shocks lnmpk lnd lnQ lnneq ln(I=K)
lnmpk 0:869 0:068 0:153 0:043 0:480
lnd 0:015 0:897 0:015 0:059 0:014
lnQ 0:002 0:012 0:727 0:003 0:075
lnneq 0:002 0:000 0:083 0:884 0:015
ln(I=K) 0:111 0:023 0:021 0:010 0:416
37Figure 1
Equilibrium price bubble (B) and share issuance (n)
Figure 2
The effect of an increase in dispersion 
 
 
































































































Comparison of Nasdaq vs. NYSE firms for the time period 1990-2002.  Figure (a) plots the 
stock market index. Figures (b)-(f) plot the log of the (trimmed) sample means in each year, 














Vector-autoregressions for 3-variable model.  Column headings indicate 
response variables; row headings indicate shocks.  Horizontal axis shows 
10-year response interval (not labeled). 
Figure 5 
 
Vector-autoregressions for 5-variable model.  Column headings indicate 
response variables; row headings indicate shocks.  Horizontal axis shows 
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